Discussion Papers, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
No 2008/11:
Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?
Eivind Stensholt ()
Abstract: Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used
to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The
representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda
manipulation, i.e. introducing a third and chanceless candidate in a
2-candidate race, and the possibility to win a 3-candidate election through
different kinds of strategic voting. Here the focus is on the "burying"
strategy in single-winner elections, where the win is obtained by ranking a
main competitor artificially low. Condorcet methods are compared with the
major alternatives (Borda Count, Approval Voting, Instant Runoff Voting).
Various Condorcet methods are studied, and one method is proposed that
minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles where burying is possible.
Keywords: Preferential election methods; agenda manipulation; strategic voting; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D72; (follow links to similar papers)
33 pages, June 12, 2008
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