Discussion Papers, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
No 2008/12:
Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection
Eivind Stensholt ()
Abstract: A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a
corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is
constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem.
Keywords: Preferential election methods; impossibility theorem; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D72; (follow links to similar papers)
3 pages, June 12, 2008
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