Discussion Papers, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
Multinationals, Minority Ownership and Tax-Efficient Financing Structures
() and Guttorm Schjelderup
Abstract: We model how multinationals structure their borrowing and
lending transactions and find that affiliates in high-tax countries have
higher internal and overall debt ratios and lower rental rates of physical
capital than comparable domestic firms. We also show that affiliates with
minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates.
Keywords: Multinational enterprises; tax-efficient financing structures; minority ownership; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: F23; H25; (follow links to similar papers)
22 pages, October 17, 2008
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