Discussion Papers, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
No 2009/9:
On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets
Hans Jarle Kind ()
, Marko Koethenbuerger ()
and Guttorm Schjelderup ()
Abstract: A benchmark result in public economics is that it is
possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly
subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such
revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.
Keywords: Ad Valorem Taxes; Unit Taxes; Two-Sided Markets; Revenue-Dominance; Welfare-Dominance; Monopoly; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D40; H20; L10; (follow links to similar papers)
8 pages, September 15, 2009
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