Discussion Papers, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
Making Bank: Why High Bank Leverage is Optimal - for the Bank's Shareholders
(), Aksel Mjøs
() and Svein-Arne Persson
Abstract: We create a structural credit model to calculate the
optimal capital structure for a bank that provides asset backed loans, such
as corporate loans and mortgages. The bank's assets are loans, which means
that the bank's exposure to risk is mitigated by the borrower's equity. We
capture the effect of this mitigation by including the borrower's leverage,
in addition to its asset volatility, as the sources of risk for the bank.
Our results contribute a quantitative explanation for the high levels of
bank leverage observed in practice. When unconstrained by regulation, the
bank's shareholders find it optimal, for reasonable values of borrower risk
parameters, to select a bank leverage close to 100%.
Keywords: Structural credit model; optimal capital structure; asset backed loans; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: G00; G21; (follow links to similar papers)
37 pages, November 27, 2015
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