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Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) Discussion Papers, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

No 2017/1:
Conditions for effective risk sharing against marine pollution: the case of the Rķa de Vigo

Schimon Grossmann () and Michael Faure ()

Abstract: The question of how effective protection against environmental impairment can be provided has spawned much literature. One instrument that is often invoked to provide compensation for environmental damage is insurance. Traditionally, a distinction is made between first and third party insurance. First party insurance may be acquired by potential victims of marine pollution, such as fisheries seriously harmed by ship-source oil spills. Conversely, third party insurance is sought by polluters to cover their legal responsibility and, at the same time, protect the potential victims from polluters unable to meet their financial obligations.

Keywords: Risk sharing; marine pollution; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: Q50; Q53; (follow links to similar papers)

11 pages, January 31, 2017

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