Working Paper Series, School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Åshild Auglænd Johnsen
Conspiracy against the public - an experiment on collusion
Abstract: Cooperation is usually presented as prosocial and for the
common good. But collusion is also a form of cooperation, where the gains
from cooperation are at the public’s expense. How is collusion affected by
this public aspect? Social preferences can mean caring for the public. But
it can also mean caring for the bilateral relationship with one’s partner.
This paper investigates cooperation when it is at the expense of the
public, and compares it to cooperation when it is not at the public’s
expense. I do so by running two versions of an infinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game: One version with and one without a public aspect.
I find that there is more collusion when collusion is at the expense of the
public conspiracy against the public.
Keywords: Infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game; Negative externality; Cooperation; Collusion; Experiment; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C91; D03; D62; H41; (follow links to similar papers)
27 pages, May 3, 2017
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