Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Memorandum,
Oslo University, Department of Economics
No 06/2002: The Duration and Outcome of Unemployment Spells- The role of Economic Incentives
Knut Røed () and Tao Zhang
Additional contact information
Knut Røed: The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Postal: Gaustadalléen 21, N-0349 Oslo, Norway, http://www.frisch.uio.no/frisch_eng.html
Tao Zhang: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: We investigate how transitions from unemployment are affected by economic incentives and spell duration. Based on unique Norwegian register data that exhibit the rarity of random-assignment-like variation in economic incentives, the causal parameters are identified without reliance on distributional assumptions or functional form restrictions. We find that the hazard rates are negatively affected by the replacement ratio, but that the size of these effects varies considerably among individuals. There is strong negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the ‘discouragement’ hazard. The employment hazard rises substantially in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion.
Keywords: Competing risks; unemployment duration; random assignment
34 pages, June 16, 2003
Full text files
Memo-06-2002.pdf
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