Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation
(), Richard B. Howarth
() and Kjell Arne Brekke
Abstract: “Green” consumers appear to accept individual
responsibility for public good provision. The propensity to take such
responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for
consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions.
This can produce multiple equilibria, with either high or low demand for
“green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved
through permanent or temporary taxes, or through advertising that
temporarily influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external
effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the
individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.
Keywords: Moral motivation; multiple Nash equilibria; green taxes; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D11; H41; Q20; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, August 10, 2003
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- This paper is published as:
Nyborg, Karine, Richard B. Howarth and Kjell Arne Brekke, (2006), 'Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation', Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 28, November, No. 4, pages 351-366
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