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Health Economics Research Programme, University of Oslo HERO On line Working Paper Series

No 2001:1:
Health Insurance: Treatment vs. Compensation

Geir Asheim (), Tore Nilssen () and Anne Wenche Emblem ()

Abstract: In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in income. We discuss how an individual’s ability when healthy affects her decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full recovery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation for the resulting loss in income. We find that a highability individual demands full recovery and is fully insured, while a low-ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation and is only partly insured.

Keywords: Health Insurance; Treatment; Compensation; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D81; G22; I11; (follow links to similar papers)

17 pages, June 30, 2009

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