Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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Health Economics Research Programme, University of Oslo HERO On line Working Paper Series

No 2002:13:
Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?

Geir B. Asheim (), Tore Nilssen () and Anne Wenche Emblem ()

Abstract: We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.

Keywords: Health insurance; adverse selection; deductibles; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D82; I11; (follow links to similar papers)

17 pages, June 29, 2009

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