HERO On line Working Paper Series
Geir B. Asheim
Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?
(), Tore Nilssen
() and Anne Wenche Emblem
Abstract: We study a health-insurance market where individuals are
offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income.
Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private
information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate
ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts
yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in
pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a
deductible in pain.
Keywords: Health insurance; adverse selection; deductibles; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D82; I11; (follow links to similar papers)
17 pages, June 29, 2009
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Anbjørg Kolaas ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom