HERO On line Working Paper Series
Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study*
(), Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Tor Iversen
Abstract: Quality improvements in markets for medical care are key
objectives in any Health reform. An important question is whether
disclosing physicians’ performance can contribute to achieving these goals.
Due to the asymmetric information inherent in medical markets, one may
argue that changes in the information structure are likely to influence the
environment in which health care providers operate. In a Laboratory
experiment with medical students that mimics a physician decision-making
environment we analyze the effect of disclosing performance information to
peers. Our results suggest that the information structure does influence
the individual physician’s supply of medical services. Under performance
disclosure, choices that are in accordance with the medical norm or
maximize the joint benefit become more frequent.
Keywords: Physician payment system; laboratory experiment; incentives; performance disclosure; fee-for-service; information and product quality; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C91; H40; I11; J33; L15; (follow links to similar papers)
32 pages, November 9, 2015
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