Discussion Papers of Business and Economics
Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark
Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Distributions for Bimatrix Outcome Game Forms
(), Francisco Marhuenda
() and Peter Sudhölter
Abstract: We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the
generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by
the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game
form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two
matrices constructed from the original game form.
Keywords: Outcome game form; Completely mixed Nash equilibrium; Generic finiteness; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; (follow links to similar papers)
10 pages, May 17, 2017
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