Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Discussion Papers on Economics,
University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics
No 9/2022: Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
Peter Sudhölter (), José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez () and Cori Vilella ()
Additional contact information
Peter Sudhölter: Department of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez: Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Postal: Departament d’Economia and ECO-SOS, Av.Universitat 1,, 43204 Reus , Spain
Cori Vilella: Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Postal: Dep. de Gesti´o d’Empreses and ECO-SOS, Av.Universitat 1 , 43204 Reus , Spain
Abstract: A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative allocation according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
Keywords: nontransferable utility; average monotonicity; core; population monotonicity
JEL-codes: C71
Language: English
12 pages, October 29, 2022
Full text files
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