SIFR Research Report Series, Institute for Financial Research
Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs
Abstract: This paper studies separation payments made when CEOs
leave their firms. In a sample of 179 exiting Fortune 500 CEOs, more than
half receive severance pay and the mean separation package is worth $5.4
million. The large majority of severance pay is awarded on a discretionary
basis by the board of directors and not according to terms of an employment
agreement. For the subset of exiting CEOs who are dismissed, separation pay
generally conforms to theories related to bonding and damage control.
Shareholders react negatively when separation agreements are disclosed, but
only in cases of voluntary CEO turnover.
Keywords: CEO turnover; severance pay; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: G34; (follow links to similar papers)
34 pages, February 15, 2006
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