CERE Working Papers, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics
Kelly Chloe de Bruin
The Role of Proactive Adaptation in International Climate Change Mitigation Agreements
(), Hans-Peter Weikard
() and Rob Dellink
Abstract: This paper investigates the role of proactive adaptation
in international mitigation coalition formation. Adaptation is introduced
into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. We analytically
derive the optimal level of mitigation and proactive adaptation for the
singletons and coalition members. We introduce the AD-STACO model which is
constructed based on the STACO model, which is an applied three-stage
cartel formation model with 12 heterogenous regions. Simulating all
possible coalitions (4084) and checking for internal and external
stability, we investigate how different levels of proactive adaptation will
affect the payoffs in Grand coalition and the incentives to freeride. We
examine which stable coalitions are found with different levels of
proactive adaptation and whether regions can gain from overadaptation in
the best performing stable coalition. We find that though payoffs increase
in the Grand coalition with lower adaptation, incentives to leave increase.
Coalition members can increase their payoffs through overadaptation.
Keywords: N/A; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: Q54; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, May 27, 2011
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Mona Bonta Bergman ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom