Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Geir B. Asheim
Amissibility and Common Belief
() and Martin Dufwenberg
Abstract: The concept of ‘fully permissible sets ’ is defined by an
algorithm that eliminate strategy subset . It is characterized as choice
sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player
prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominate
the latter on the sets of all opponent strategie or on the union of the
choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. the concept refines
the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.
Keywords: Admissibility; Denkel-Fudenberg; common belief; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; (follow links to similar papers)
28 pages, February 29, 2000
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