Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Geir B Asheim
Deductive reasoning in Extensive Games
Abstract: We justify the application to extensive games of the
concept of ‘fully permissible sets’, which corresponds to choice sets when
there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one
strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter
on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets
that are deemed possible for the opponent. he e tensive games considered
illustrate how our concept yields support to forward induction, without
necessarily promoting backward induction.
Keywords: Extensive Game; Deductive reasoning; backward induction; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, February 29, 2000
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