Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Vertical Integration and Competition Policy
Abstract: Recently, the European Commission has decided to implement
a simplified procedure in the context of vertical integration. If the
combined market shares of the merging firms are less than 25 percent,
upstream and downstream, the Commission will consider the merger harmless.
The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare aspects of vertical
integration in a simple model and investigate the accuracy of the proposed
rule of thumb. The welfare implications of vertical integration turn out to
depend on relative market shares and the degree of product differentiation.
Basically, a merger is harmless from a social point of view when the
upstream market is relatively concentrated compared to the downstream
market and/or if products are sufficiently close substitutes. We therefore
suggest an alternative screening rule: If the upstream market is
significantly less concentrated than the downstream market, or if products
obviously are close substitutes, mergers may be approved at an early stage
of the screening process. Otherwise the merger may be detrimental to
welfare and the competition authority should evaluate it more carefully.
Keywords: Vertical Integration; Merger; Competition Policy; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: L13; L42; (follow links to similar papers)
18 pages, January 24, 2001
- This paper is published as:
Häckner, Jonas, (2003), 'Vertical Integration and Competition Policy', Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, pages 213-222
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