Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Political Media Contests and Confirmatory Bias
Abstract: This paper models a two-period media contest between two
candidates campaigning to win an election. Two main cases
are examined. In the first case voters behave as unbiased Bayesian
updaters when assessing political information. The second case considers
voters suffering from confirmatory bias. In the first case I find
that candidates spend equal amounts of their campaign funds in both
periods in equilibrium. In the second case, candidates spend more
period one. A candidate with better media access (in period one)
however, better if voters suﬀer from confirmatory bias than if
they do not.
Keywords: Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias. Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias. Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias. Election campaigns; voting behavior; confirmatory bias; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D72; D81; D83; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, January 29, 2002
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