Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Blowing the Whistle
(), Martin Dufwenberg
() and Reinhard Selten
Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if
they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The
authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is
not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by
providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact
of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C92; D43; L13; (follow links to similar papers)
29 pages, May 6, 2003
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