Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
No 2005:2:
Can We Trust Private Firms as Suppliers of Vaccine for the Avian Influenza?
Rikard Forslid ()
Abstract: Using a simple monopoly model, this note analyses the
incentives of a vaccine producer. Because a vaccine tends to eradicate the
disease for wich it is intended, it also tends to destroy its own market.
This means that monopolistic producers may be tempted, in a socially
non-optimal way, to delay the introduction of vaccines against new
infections until the disease has spread.
Keywords: Vaccines; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D42; D62; H10; I18; L10; (follow links to similar papers)
5 pages, February 22, 2005, Revised February 6, 2006
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