Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University
Are Married Spouses Insured by their Partnersí Social Insurance?
() and Peter Skogman Thoursie
Abstract: We use a Swedish sickness insurance reform to show that
among married couples a partnerís benefit level affects spousal labour
supply. The spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partnerís
benefit is estimated to be 0.4, which is about one-fourth of the own labor
supply elasticity. It is argued the main part of this effect is an
insurance income effect.
Keywords: Spousal labor supply; spill-over; social insurance programs; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D10; J12; J22; (follow links to similar papers)
7 pages, December 9, 2010
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