Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Department of Economics, Stockholm University Research Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Stockholm University

No 2013:14:
The Social Egoist

Anne Boschini (), Astri Muren () and Mats Persson ()

Abstract: People cooperate more in one-shot interactions than can be explained by standard textbook preferences. We discuss a set of non-standard preferences that can accommodate such behavior. They are social, in the sense of incorporating the payoffs of other persons; they are also norm-based, in the sense of taking into account the behavior of other persons. We show theoretically that, with such preferences, a Nash equilibrium with a strictly positive cooperation rate can exist. We use experimental data on within-subject decisions to show that such preferences are empirically plausible. The data show that, in addition to the well-known types (egoist, altruist, reciprocator), there is an important group: the social egoist. Such individuals care for people who have cooperated, but ignore people who have broken the implicit cooperation norm in society. The social egoists, who turn out to be different from “conditional cooperators”, account for one third of the observations in our experiment.

Keywords: social norms; prisoner’s dilemma; hawk-dove game; egoism; altruism; reciprocity; conditional cooperation; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C91; D03; D64; (follow links to similar papers)

42 pages, October 10, 2013

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

wp13_14.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sten Nyberg ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2013_0014 This page was generated on 2016-11-07 22:04:16