Umeå Economic Studies, Department of Economics, Umeå University
No 468:
Auctioned and Re-auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden
Mats Bergman ()
and Sofia Lundberg ()
Abstract: During the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children
were boarded out. The foster-parents' compensation was determined in
English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data
from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly
adverse selection affected the outcome in the market for re-auctioned
children. The empirical findings are consistent with adverse selection.
Keywords: Adverse selection; asymmetric information; common value; English auction; private values; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D44; N33; (follow links to similar papers)
29 pages, May 13, 1998
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