Umeå Economic Studies, Department of Economics, Umeå University
No 713:
Collective Action and Common Agricultural Policy Lobbying: Evidence of Euro-Group Influence, 1986-2003
Thomas Jonsson ()
Abstract: This paper attempts to explain Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) subsidies to farmers by the in.uence of farmer interest-groups with
an EU-wide membership (so called Euro-groups). The analysis is based on
panel-data for .fteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the
CAP is set as an overall EU policy, e¤ective lobbying presents a collective
action problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying,
which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the
variation in agricultural support, suggesting that farmer Euro-groups
in.uence agricultural policy within the EU.
Keywords: Agricultural policy; political economy; lobbying; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H43; Q18; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, June 7, 2007
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