Umeå Economic Studies, Department of Economics, Umeå University
No 715:
General Income Taxation, Public Goods and Decentralized Leadership
Thomas Aronsson ()
Abstract: This paper concerns redistribution and public good
provision under asymmetric information, which are here ingredients of a
policy-problem facing each member state (nation) of an economic federation
with decentralized leadership. Each member state is assumed to have its own
redistributive policy and pattern of public consumption, whereas the
federal level redistributes (ex-post) between the member states. The
results show how and why federal ex-post redistribution may modify the use
of income taxation and public good provision at the national level,
relative to the policy outcome in the absence of a federal government, as
well as how the national policy incentives depend on whether or not the
federal government uses distortionary taxes.
Keywords: Income taxation; redistribution; public goods; fiscal federalism; decentralized leadership; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D31; D60; D82; H21; (follow links to similar papers)
29 pages, August 31, 2007
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