Working Paper Series, Uppsala Center for Labor Studies, Department of Economics, Uppsala University
The medical doctors as gatekeepers in the sickness insurance?
() and Per Johansson
Abstract: Based on a randomised experiment we estimate effects from
notification to medical doctors of tighter monitoring of their medical
certificates. Both time prescribed by the doctor certificates for sick
leave (prescribed sick leave) and the impact on the length of the actual
sickness absence (actual sick leave) is studied. We find no effect on the
total number of prescribed sick leave days. We do, however, find an
increase in both prescribed and actual sick leave with a 25 percent work
inability. We also find that the notification letter causes an increase in
actual sick leave (i.e. the number of reimbursed sick days). We discuss a
number of potential explanations for this rather surprising result.
Keywords: monitoring; moral hazard; public social insurance; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C93; H51; H55; J22; (follow links to similar papers)
35 pages, June 1, 2009
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