Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Uppsala University
No 2002:5:
Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions Between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance in Sweden
Laura Larsson ()
Abstract: This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the
interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance
(SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. There
are two main topics of interest: how the sickness report rate and the
length of the subsequent sick period among the unemployed are affected by
(i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the difference in
maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by
duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit
expiration date approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect
on the sick-report rate because SI offers greater compensation than UI. But
neither of these factors seems to have a significant effect on the length
of the sick period.
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; sickness insurance; health; duration analysis; discrete hazard models; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C41; H55; I18; J64; J65; (follow links to similar papers)
34 pages, March 18, 2002
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- This paper is forthcoming as:
-
Larsson, Laura, 'Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions Between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance in Sweden', The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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