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Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University CAFO Working Papers, Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University

No 2009:4:
Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information

Klas Sandén ()

Abstract: This paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Copyright; Reward system; Legislation; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D20; D82; (follow links to similar papers)

25 pages, September 26, 2008

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