CAFO Working Papers, Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University
Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information
Abstract: This paper makes a theoretical contribution by
investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden
information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The
regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of
firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate
a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with
asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Copyright; Reward system; Legislation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D20; D82; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, September 26, 2008
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