Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Focus is here on coalitional games among economic agents plagued by aggregate pollutions of diverse sorts. Defecting players presumably pollute more than others. Then, granted convex preferences and technologies, the core is proven nonempty. In fact, under natural assumptions, a specific, computable core solution comes in terms of shadow prices on the said aggregates. Such prices may, in large part, implement the cooperative treaty by clearing a competitive market for emissions.

Keywords: Cooperative Games; Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distribution Effects; Employment Effects

JEL-codes: C71; Q52

6 pages, September 23, 2002

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