Hermann Bardarson (hermann.bardarson@econ.uib.no)
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Hermann Bardarson: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Abstract: The use of renewable resources is examined as a cooperative production game, the focus here being on fisheries. It is shown how pooling and exchange of individual endowments may open for substitutions that generate greater efficiency. We introduce a sharing rule that complies with the core concept, applied to heterogeneous multi-species fisheries with transferable utility.
Keywords: Resource management; fisheries; heterogeneity; linear programming; cooperative games; core allocations; substitution possibilities; common property.
11 pages, May 7, 2003
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07-03.pdfFull text
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