Hermann Bardarson ()
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Hermann Bardarson: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen
Abstract: Pooling and exchange of random resources may offer the owners insurance and substitution. Greater efficiency and more stable revenues thereby obtain. These good properties derive from a sharing rule that complies with the core concept from cooperative production games. It is applied here to fisheries with stochastic yield.
Keywords: Resource management; randomization; risk; insurance; cooperative games; core allocations; mutual exchange; stochastic programming; communal fisheries.
11 pages, December 28, 2003
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