Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Cournot-type models of markets in property rights typically feature strategists–acting at a first stage–followed by the move of a non-empty marketclearing competitive fringe. So, which agents can presumably be assigned the price-taking role? When simulating the upcoming medium-sized market for greenhouse gas emissions permits under the Kyoto Protocol, no answer to this question stands out as satisfactory. As an escape, trade is instead construed as a two-stage noncooperative cooperative game in which all agents act on both stages, allowing everyone to be a strategist.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; competitive fringe; market games; property rights; emissions trading; Kyoto Protocol.

JEL-codes: C72; D43; D51; Q58

20 pages, April 5, 2005

Full text files

No.%2004-05.pdf  Full text

Download statistics

• University of Bergen, Department of Economics
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Kjell Erik Lommerud ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:bergec:2005_005This page generated on 2024-10-27 22:37:47.