Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Abstract. Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferableutility, cooperative game, featuring risk averse players. Like in competitive equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent claims. And like in finance, no risk can properly be priced only in terms of its marginal distribution. Pricing rather depends on the pooled risk and on the convolution of individual preferences. The paper elaborates on these features, placing emphasis on the role of prices and incompleteness. Some novelties come by bringing questions about existence, computation and uniqueness of solutions to revolve around standard Lagrangian duality. Especially outlined is how repeated bilateral trade may bring about a price-supported core allocation.

Keywords: Keywords: cooperative game; transferable utility; core; risks; mutual insurance; contingent prices; bilateral exchange; supergradients; stochastic approximation.

JEL-codes: C71; D52; G12

18 pages, April 1, 2011

Full text files

No.%2009-06.pdf  Full text

Download statistics

• University of Bergen, Department of Economics
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Kjell Erik Lommerud ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:bergec:2006_009This page generated on 2024-10-27 22:37:47.