Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a model where two parties, one from the left and one from the right, compete for position. The election is to be held in the near future and the outcome is uncertain. Prior to the election, the members of both parties nominate their prime ministerial candidates. Investors care about the outcome since they may invest in irreversible domestic production capital. We find that there is political convergence in the nomination process. In some circumstances, it is only the median voter of the left-wing party that elects a more moderate candidate. In other instances, the members of both parties nominate more "conservative" candidates, but there is still convergence. We also show that a higher probability of the left winning the election increases the degree of convergence, while a more globalised economy (greater capital mobility) reduces it.

Keywords: Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination; International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; Political Economy.

JEL-codes: E61; F21; H24; P16

21 pages, January 27, 2008

Full text files

No.%2002-07.pdf  Full text

Download statistics

• University of Bergen, Department of Economics
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Kjell Erik Lommerud ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:bergec:2007_002This page generated on 2024-10-27 22:37:47.