Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

No 04/07: Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core

Sjur Didrik Flåm () and L. Koutsougeras ()
Additional contact information
Sjur Didrik Flåm: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
L. Koutsougeras: School of Economics, University of Manchester,, Postal: Oxford Road M13 9PL UK.

Abstract: Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the other for knowledge. Focus is on specific, computable solutions that are generated by such prices and belong to the private core. Solutions of that sort obtain under standard regularity assumptions.

Keywords: exchange economy; cooperative game; transferable utility; differential information; private core; Lagrangian duality; value of information.

JEL-codes: C62; C71; D51; D82

26 pages, February 7, 2007

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