Kristin Linnerud () and Steinar Vagstad ()
Additional contact information
Kristin Linnerud: CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, Postal: P.O. Box 1129, Blindern, N-0318 Oslo, Norway
Steinar Vagstad: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Abstract: We examine the optimal regulation of agricultural markets when farmers have organized their activity in a cooperative which is the monopoly supplier of an upstream product and which competes with a single rival firm in selling a homogenous downstream product. The rival's marginal cost is private information and therefore the rival expects to earn an information rent. We show that the optimal access price discriminates against the private rival because rent is more valuable in the cooperative than in the private firm, and the regulator therefore sacrifices some cost efficiency in order to shift rents. Thus, while competition will benefit farmers, consumers and tax payers, the extent of competition should optimally be somewhat limited.
Keywords: Agricultural markets; cooperatives; regulation; access pricing.
JEL-codes: D82; L12; L23; L33; L43; L51; Q13
22 pages, June 10, 2008
Full text files
wp06-08.pdf Full text
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Kjell Erik Lommerud ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:bergec:2008_006This page generated on 2024-10-27 22:37:47.