Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper illustrates how, in local retail markets, a multiproduct retailer may gain buyer power when some consumers are one-stop shoppers (multi-product shop-pers). We consider a model where independent suppliers negotiate terms of trade with a large multiproduct retailer and a group of smaller single product retailers, respectively. We find that an increase in the share of one-stop shoppers intensifies the degree of competition between the retailers, and hence reduces the overall industry profit –while at the same time enabling the multiproduct retailer to obtain discounts from its suppliers, in the form of lower fixed fees. We also show that the presence of a large retailer may positively affect the suppliers’incentives to invest in product quality or cost reductions.

Keywords: one-stop shopping; buyer power; dynamic effi- ciency; public policy

JEL-codes: L11; L22; L25; L41; L42

152 pages, February 1, 2012

Full text files

WP.03.12.pdf  Full text

Download statistics

• University of Bergen, Department of Economics
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Kjell Erik Lommerud ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:bergec:2012_003This page generated on 2024-10-27 22:37:47.