Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers in Economics,
University of Bergen, Department of Economics

No 01/16: Reciprocity evolving: partner choice and communication in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma

Eirik Strømland (), Sigve Tjøtta () and Gaute Torsvik ()
Additional contact information
Eirik Strømland: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Postal: P.O. 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
Sigve Tjøtta: Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Postal: P.O. 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
Gaute Torsvik: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: Moltke Moes vei 31, Eilert Sundts Hus, 0317 OSLO, Norway

Abstract: Through what mechanisms do individuals enforce cooperation? In this paper, we show experimentally that partner choice by mutual consent improves cooperation compared to random matching of subjects. We find that partner choice is used to establish lasting reciprocal partnerships and thus that partner choice may be a force in the evolution of reciprocal cooperation. There is no additional impact on cooperation by allowing for both chat and partner choice. Our findings suggest that partner choice will improve cooperation in settings where ongoing group communication is infeasible, but not when there are opportunities to use large-scale communication to enforce cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperation; Partner Choice; Communication; Reciprocity; Prisoner’s Dilemma

JEL-codes: C91; C92

33 pages, February 15, 2016

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