BOFIT Discussion Papers, Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland
No 6/2013:
Political connections and depositor discipline
Mustafa Disli ()
, Koen Schoors ()
and Jos Meir ()
Abstract: We examine the effects of political connections on
depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former
members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline,
especially if the former politician’s party is currently in power – less so
if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural
problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results
remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce
depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because
the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term
tend to leave with them.
Keywords: depositor discipline; political connections; banks; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D70; G10; G21; (follow links to similar papers)
42 pages, April 23, 2013
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