Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance
No 2000-10: On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs
Henrik Lando and Caspar Rose
Additional contact information
Henrik Lando: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Caspar Rose: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: Abstract: We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature
on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach
remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never
claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to
perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary
payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study
enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of
specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In
Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of
enforcement to the claimant.
Keywords: Law
JEL-codes: A00
24 pages, May 1, 2001
Full text files
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