and Sven E. Feldmann
Morten Bennedsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Sven E. Feldmann: University of Chicago, Postal: University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy Studies
Abstract: We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that the effectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions.We show in a multi-period policy framework that a distinguishing feature between the US Congress and European parliamentary systems —the vote of confidence procedure — can significantly change the incentives for interest group lobbying.
26 pages, January 1, 2002
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