Johan E Eklund
Johan E Eklund: Ratio Institute, CESIS and JIBS
Abstract: This paper examines how ownership concentration affects investment performance, and in particular how deviations from the one share-one vote principle affect this ownership-performance relationship. Using a unique panel from the Nordic countries the so-called incentive and managerial entrenchment effects are isolated. To this end a measure of marginal q is used to evaluate performance. This is a theoretically and empirically more appropriate measure of performance as compared to Tobin’s q. The main finding is that ownership concentration improves performance, whereas dual-class shares reduce the incentive effect and enhance the managerial entrenchment effect. On average, firms with dual-class shares over-invest.
31 pages, January 28, 2009
Full text files
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Vardan Hovsepyan ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2018-01-23 23:31:24.