Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Discussion Papers,
Statistics Norway, Research Department
No 280: Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental evaluation
Morten Søberg ()
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Morten Søberg: Statistics Norway
Abstract: This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid, offer, and double auction markets. The main result is that cost-effectiveness and supra-competitive profits accrued by the monopolist are observed on all the three auction markets.
Keywords: Market power; tradable permits; and experimental economics.
JEL-codes: L12; Q25; C91 July 2000
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dp280.pdf
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