Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Discussion Papers,
Statistics Norway, Research Department
No 680: Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway
Kjetil Telle ()
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Kjetil Telle: Statistics Norway
Abstract: Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on compliance, but an audit raises the firm's subsequent compliance substantially.
Keywords: environmental regulation; enforcement; EPA; natural field experiment; random assignment
JEL-codes: K42; C93; Q58; D21; H41 February 2012
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