Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

No 95: Anyone for Higher Speed Limits? - Self-Interested and Adaptive Political Preferences

Olof Johansson-Stenman and Peter Martinsson ()
Additional contact information
Olof Johansson-Stenman: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Peter Martinsson: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG

Abstract: Swedish survey-evidence indicates that variables reflecting self-interest are important in explaining people’s preferred speed limits, and that political preferences adapt to technological development. Drivers of cars that are newer (and hence safer), bigger, and with better high-speed characteristics, prefer higher speed limits, as do those who believe they drive better than average, whereas elderly people prefer lower limits. Furthermore, people report that they themselves vote more sociotropically than they believe others to vote, on average. Self-serving biases are proposed as a bridge between subjectively perceived expressive and sociotropic voting behavior, versus objectively self-interested voting behavior.

Keywords: Speed limits; self-interested voting; expressive voting; sociotropic voting; selfserving bias; adaptive political preferences

JEL-codes: D70

17 pages, March 28, 2003

Note: Publised in Public Choice, 2005, Vol. 122, pp. 319-331.

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