Olof Johansson-Stenman ()
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Olof Johansson-Stenman: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: Global environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level. This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited nonpaternalistic altruism.
Keywords: Global environmental problems; externalities; altruism; transboundary pollution
JEL-codes: D61; D62; D63; D64; Q20
10 pages, August 9, 2004
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