Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

No 183: Property Rights, Risk and Leverage

Richard A. Graff and Jr. Joseph P. Kairys ()
Additional contact information
Richard A. Graff: Electrum Partners L.L.C., Postal: Chicago, IL
Jr. Joseph P. Kairys: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG

Abstract: Risk matters when corporate debt has a positive probability of default. Lenders have traditionally used covenants to protect their property rights because the financing and operating decisions of firms can reduce the value of the firm’s outstanding debt. We examine the use of captive finance subsidiaries and special purposed entities (SPEs) to partition default risk within the firm. A more complex arrangement of property rights within the firm allows the parent firm to retain operating flexibility while offering lenders better protection. We conclude that capital structure is a relevant decision variable for corporate managers because firms are able to obtain leveraged finance at a lower cost when risk is partitioned using separate legal structures within the firm.

Keywords: capital structure; captive finance companies; structured finance

JEL-codes: D23; G32

44 pages, October 31, 2005

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