Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
Working Papers in Economics,
University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
No 254: Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet
Elias Tsakas ()
Additional contact information
Elias Tsakas: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Department of Economics., School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Abstract: I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the population to agree not to bet.
Keywords: Gamble; private information; communication; common knowledge
9 pages, June 18, 2007
Full text files
4575 HTML file
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2024-02-05 17:11:22.